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Abstract:  
 
Digital intermediaries such as Google and Facebook are seen as the new power brokers in online 
news, controlling access to consumers and even suppressing or targeting messages. After 
reviewing literature that raised this concern, this paper examines empirical evidence for the claim 
that intermediaries pose a threat to news plurality. We introduce a three-stage analytical 
framework for measuring the role of intermediaries within the current policy framework for 
media plurality: (i) analysis of share of online in news consumption (ii) role of intermediaries 
(iii) degree of bias versus neutrality of intermediary control of news. Through secondary analysis 
of UK industry data on referrals of online news traffic, we find that an increasing proportion of 
news is delivered online, and a significant proportion of online news is accessed via 
intermediaries. However, we find that not all news that is filtered through intermediary services 
is subject to the same shaping and editorial forces, in part because user agency is also an 
important factor. The role of intermediaries in news distribution is thus complex; market share 
and market concentration does not translate automatically into influence due to the complex 
interplay between user agency and the editorial influence of intermediaries.  
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Introduction  
 
Search providers, social networks, platforms and app stores are increasingly seen as the new 
power brokers, usurping dominance of multiple media markets, grabbing control of complex 
ecologies of advertising and personal information and potentially even undermining democracy 
(Epstein and Robertson, 2013; Mansell, 2014; Moore, 2014; Zittrain, 2014). These 
intermediaries appear to be building a new form of power over the dissemination of news and 
information (Rosen, 2011; Bell, 2014; Helberger, 2012; 2014a; 2014b; Brock, 2015).  
 
This article aims to examine the empirical support for these claims, focusing on the role of 
intermediaries in relation to ‘news plurality’. We use this catch-all phrase because ‘plurality’ 
(‘diversity’ in the US) is the relevant legal concept used to measure, and prevent abuse of, media 
power. Section 1 reviews the current policy and academic debate about the role of intermediaries 
in news distribution. Section 2 looks at the relevant theoretical frameworks through which to 
analyse intermediaries, with a focus on media pluralism. Section 3 examines the empirical 
evidence that intermediaries pose a threat to plurality by examining the influence that they have 
on news that people are exposed to. Section 4 offers some discussion points before concluding.  
 
Section 1: Academic, Industry and Policy Concerns about Digital Intermediaries 
 
There have been widespread calls to explore the democratic implications of new forms of 
influence over public opinion formation. Zittrain (2014) questions the Facebook voting 
experiment, which saw targeted messages increase turnout in local elections to illustrate how 
intermediaries could opaquely determine the outcome in elections. Rosen (2011; 2013) 
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highlights the shadowy “deciders” that increasingly determine what content audiences see. 
Tufekci (2014) compares the allegedly ‘neutral’ Twitter to filtered Facebook newsfeeds whose 
‘algorithmic censorship’ ‘edited out’ updates on the disturbances in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014. 
Emily Bell (2014) notes that journalistic values are increasingly being lost to algorithmic black 
boxes, which lack transparency and accountability, while Poell and van Dijck (2014; 2015) argue 
that the algorithmic mechanisms through which intermediaries mediate news threaten 
independent journalism and public debate. 
 
Alongside these academic complaints about the ability of intermediaries to influence the process 
of opinion formation in society, news publishers have launched a more self-interested opposition 
to the intermediaries. Mathias Döpfner (2014), CEO of Axel Springer, claimed, “Our business 
relationship is that of the Goliath of Google to the David of Axel Springer. When Google 
changed an algorithm, one of our subsidiaries lost 70 percent of its traffic within a few days [...] 
we are afraid of Google.” Andrew Miller (2014), when CEO of the Guardian Media Group, 
expressed concern about the influence of intermediaries on the media and the conflict between 
the desire to be agnostic platforms and their media funded business models. Meanwhile 
Facebook’s excursion into public interest journalism (by driving more traffic to news publishers 
and hosting news content) (Marshall, 2013; Osofsky, 2013; Garrahan and Kuchler, 2016; 
Kacholia and Li, 2013) has raised concerns amongst publishers. As Ravi Somaiya (2014) of the 
New York Times puts it;  “The social media company is increasingly becoming to the news 
business what Amazon is to book publishing — a behemoth that provides access to hundreds of 
millions of consumers and wields enormous power.” 
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Wary of such algorithm changes which caused falls in web traffic (Sullivan, 2014; Abbas, 2014), 
publishers are critical of the role of intermediaries in news distribution (Kafka, 2015). These 
concerns come during a time where there is widespread public policy pressure around Europe to 
ensure that intermediaries respect a range of public interest goals (Kohl, 2013; Mansell, 2014; 
Goodman, 2014; Napoli, 2014; Van Eijk, 2009) including the diversity of opinions and news in 
society. In France, the Conseil d’Etat (2014) has recommended a review of the liability of 
Internet intermediaries and the establishment of a new legal category of Internet platforms. The 
European Commission (2012; 2015a) has indicated that it wishes to review the liability limits for 
intermediaries that feature in the E-Commerce Directive and has launched a consultation on 
Internet platforms. Following a House of Lords Inquiry (2014), the UK government (DCMS, 
2014) asked the regulator Ofcom (2012; 2015) to develop a new measurement framework that 
takes into account intermediaries in the news distribution process and sets out public 
expectations for them. 
 
It has long been accepted that serious competition issues arise from dominant positions of 
intermediaries in multi-sided markets, leading for example to the investigation of Google’s 
vertical search and mobile operating system by the European Commission (2015b; 2015c) and 
ongoing investigations into Amazon’s distribution of electronic books. Existing regulatory 
frameworks however are not designed to curtail the impact intermediaries may have on media 
plurality (Helberger et al., 2015; Mansell, 2015b). For example, current rules preventing media 
concentration and control over opinion formation in the UK and Germany specifically prevent 
large newspaper companies from purchasing influential broadcasters,[2] but would not prevent 
similar transactions between digital intermediaries and newspapers or broadcasters. 
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This raises fundamental questions about the legal framework on media plurality that protects 
democracies from concentrations of public opinion forming power. The role that intermediaries 
play in news distribution may be problematic for newspaper publishers. But it is only worthy of 
further public policy intervention if it also raises wider public policy concerns not addressed by 
current regulatory frameworks.  
 
In traditional media regulation there is an overlap between the regulatory framework for 
competition and wider public policy concerns. In particular, the sector-specific procedures for 
approving large media mergers typically include a ‘public interest’ element that ensures that 
media mergers do not result in reductions in media plurality (Harcourt, 1996; Craufurd Smith 
and Tambini, 2012). Some have argued that digital intermediaries require a similar regulatory 
approach including a sector-specific public interest element and, in particular, one that deals with 
the potential for intermediaries to have an impact on the diversity of news, information and 
commentary that circulates in society (House of Lords Select Committee on Communication, 
2014;; Wolter, 2014).  
 
Some argue the ability to influence the flow of information entails new ethical responsibilities, 
and requires new forms of regulation. Pasquale and Bracha (2008) suggest a need for direct 
regulatory intervention, “algorithm transparency” which would require Intermediaries to disclose 
details of how their algorithms work. Given the legitimate needs for protection of intellectual 
property this transparency would be qualified so that disclosure is only made to the relevant 
regulators (Pasquale, 2010). Sandvig et al (2014; 2015), Gillespie (2014) and Ananny (2016) 
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argue that researchers might need to equip themselves instead with the skills required to 
interrogate and audit the workings and ethics of algorithms. Diakopoulos (2014) suggests this 
interrogation could take the form of reverse engineering algorithms to understand the input-
output relationship. 
 
Volkoh and Falk (2012), Benjamin (2013) and others (See Brown and Davidson, 2013) on the 
other hand argue for a more laissez faire approach. Volkoh views search engines as exercising 
editorial judgement, similar to an editor of a newspaper and therefore enjoying similar freedom 
of speech rights. Tim Wu (2013) disagrees with equating a search engine to a newspaper editor. 
He argues that while newspapers ‘own’ their articles and exist to communicate persuasive 
opinions and ideas to consumers, search engines locate other people’s information and operate at 
the service of the user.  For Wu, the rule of thumb is as follows; if an algorithmic 
recommendation programme gives information to users that is merely a reflection of the users’ 
pre-existing tastes then it should not be speech protected. If the programme tries to persuade or 
influence users in new areas or the software engineer inserts his or her opinion then it should be.  
 
Intermediaries themselves deny editorial influence. Simon Milner, Facebook UK Public Policy 
Director, informed the House of Lords Select Committee on Communication that “…when it 
comes to editorial judgments about content, we only make a judgment about whether something 
is allowed or not allowed on Facebook.” Newsfeed content “is determined by the individual user, 
what they are interested in and who is in their network.” Similarly Peter Barron, Google’s UK 
Public Affairs Head, argued that the search engine operates no “daily process of editorial 
judgements” to determine the news content users see (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Page 7 of 53 info
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Communication, 2014: 374-375). However, critics have claimed that whether they do so 
intentionally or not, they are exercising a new kind of ‘algorithmic power’ (Bucher, 2012; Beer, 
2009) by selecting, surfacing and filtering news and have called for greater transparency into 
how they do so (Ristow, 2013; Pasquale, 2010).  
 
In short, the extent to which intermediaries would justify new forms of monitoring or 
intervention to promote media plurality remains controversial, and the debate has not 
significantly shifted since Robin Foster’s (2012) report. On one hand, the intermediaries 
themselves such as Google and Facebook say that we live in a new age of crowdsourced 
plurality, and on the other hand others are concerned that intermediaries reduce both content and 
exposure plurality (Helberger et al., 2015; Napoli and Karppinen, 2013; Helberger, 2014). The 
following section introduces a new analytical framework to help ascertain whether available 
evidence would require further regulatory action or monitoring of the activities of intermediaries.  
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Section 2: Framework for Analysis 
 
2.1: Defining and Measuring Media Plurality  
 
The concept of media plurality is not merely an analytical concept: it is the key legal and policy 
construct in current regulatory frameworks that exist to limit gatekeeper power over opinion 
formation (Craufurd Smith and Tambini, 2012; Valcke, 2012). It is imperative to examine 
intermediaries within this framework because if plurality is not an appropriate framework to 
measure, evaluate and regulate influence of media, including intermediaries, on democratic 
opinion formation, then new frameworks or a revised plurality framework may be needed. 
 
Regulation to protect media plurality evolved during the twentieth century due to concern about 
newspapers and broadcasting (Craufurd Smith and Tambini, 2012; Vīķe-Freiberga et al, 2014; 
Valcke, 2011). Important interventions such as Foster (2012) and Helberger et al. (2015) that 
specifically address the issue of intermediaries and plurality stop short of investigating the 
available empirical evidence, in part because this is a new field with significant analytical 
problems, notably the complexity of the concept of media plurality itself (Napoli, 1999).[3] 

Empirical research on media influence and plurality has focused on questions of ownership con-
centration (Noam, 2011; Napoli & Gillis, 2006) media effects (Gerbner et al, 2002) agenda set-
ting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Cohen, 1963) and information flow. The rise of online inter-
mediaries raises questions about the extent to which they play a gatekeeping role in the selection, 
presentation and targeting of news. In this context, measures that simply identify market share or 
audiences of various channels or publishers will not be a sufficient measure of media plurality 
(Mansell, 2015b).   
 
Page 9 of 53 info
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
10 
 
We suggest a simplified approach: identifying if intermediaries threaten media plurality by 
assessing their gatekeeping power and position in relation to overall news consumption. Some 
generic theories in the communications field are a useful first step: Helberger et al. (2015) cite 
Barzilai-Nahon's Network Gatekeeper Theory (2008) (NGT) which develops the idea of 
information gatekeeping for the digital world. For Barzilai-Nahon, gatekeeping involves 
controlling information for example by selection, addition, manipulation, shaping, deletion and 
localization of information. The gatekeeper is the organisation, person or government with the 
discretion to control this process. The value of network gatekeeping theory is that it sensitises 
analysts to the wide range of ways that gatekeepers may have an effect on news flow. Public 
concern about intermediaries from academics and publishers relates closely to some of Barzilai-
Nahon’s types of information gatekeeping: selection (Pariser, 2011; Ristow, 2013) manipulation 
(Pasquale, 2010) and deletion (Wu, 2013) for instance.  However, previous work has not focused 
on all theoretically possible forms of gatekeeping. 
  
In the context of analysis of news plurality, intermediaries pose new questions.  The analysis of 
their market share per se, or market concentration measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) (Noam, 2011) in the manner of traditional analysis of media plurality (Craufurd 
Smith and Tambini, 2012) would not be sufficient, because analysts must also measure the full 
range of shaping and influence that such gatekeepers may exert on the flow of information. 
 
 
Intermediaries do seem to fit Barzilai-Nahon’s definition of a gatekeeper. Search engines and 
social media shape, prioritise and omit certain information on their results page. News 
aggregators personalise news snippets while app stores promote certain apps above others. 
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Intermediaries (along with broader technological developments including the ability to email 
news articles) have also facilitated the rise of ‘secondary gatekeeping’; giving online news 
consumers the ability to judge what is newsworthy and affect the news content that other readers 
see (Singer, 2014). 
 
Laidlaw (2010) and other theorists commenting on intermediary control do not link the question 
of intermediary control to wider issues of media plurality and power, but work by Helberger et 
al. (2015) does attempt t  look at the implications of intermediary power for media plurality. 
There has been little empirical evidence brought to bear so far on the question of the extent of 
intermediary influence over news distribution. As Robin Foster (2012) pointed out, the debate on 
intermediaries and plurality has so far been a mainly theoretical one on the potential for 
intermediaries to control the news flow and the harm that might potentially arise as a result. 
Scholarly attention to date has largely focussed on the search for evidence of the ‘filter bubble’ 
effect or selective exposure on intermediary platforms and the Internet at large (Barberá et al, 
2015; Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2013; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Gentzkow and 
Shapiro, 2011; An et al, 2012). While media reports have detailed the increasing reliance 
publishers now have on intermediaries for their traffic (Somaiya, 2014; Kuchler, 2015), there has 
been little interrogation of the implications of this increased reliance on media plurality and other 
public interest concerns.  According to Helberger et al. (2015: 59): “we still lack the necessary 
systematic, independent research to determine   the   impact   of   indirect   editorial   control   
exercised   through   ranking   and personalisation features.” 
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In the UK, traditional media plurality regulation was based on audience data such as BARB, 
RAJAR and ABC[4] and, as a result, decisions on mergers often rely on a relatively simple 
analysis of the size of a media company. (See section 58 in 1973 Fair Trading Act, prohibitions 
on newspaper mergers). As more news is consumed online, such traditional sources of 
information no longer provide sufficient insights and regulators face a paradox. Whilst much 
more is theoretically knowable about news distribution (due to ‘big’ data held by intermediaries 
and publishers), regulators and the public have to rely on much less reliable survey techniques 
such as Ofcom’s ‘Share of References’ (Ofcom, 2012) because the more authoritative data is not 
accessible.  
 
National regulatory authorities such as Ofcom have no specific powers to require intermediaries 
to provide proprietary data for the purposes of plurality assessment, and data held by publishers 
and intermediaries tends to be incomplete and jealously guarded. This paper therefore attempts, 
on the basis of the limited data in the public domain, to ascertain the degree and nature of 
intermediary control over news flows in the UK. Since the data in the public domain is patchy, 
the picture that emerges will not be complete.  
 
The paper argues that a future regulatory environment will require stronger powers for 
independent public authorities to require disclosure of data held by intermediaries, and a more 
coordinated approach to monitoring. We set out some of the types of data that would be required 
to provide an evidence base for public policymaking in this field. The data we review is largely 
drawn from publically available sources although we also present some proprietary de-identified 
data from the BBC and SimilarWeb, a commercial analytics monitoring service. Given the early 
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stage of empirical investigation in this field in both academic and regulatory terms, the aim is not 
for an exhaustive survey, but a best efforts dip into the available evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2: What is a Digital Intermediary? 
 
Foster (2012: 24) defines digital intermediaries as “organisations which bring news content from 
third party providers to consumers using a variety of digital software, channels and devices.” 
While this definition captures the essence of what intermediaries do, it is unclear which types of 
organisations and content are in scope. We put forward a new definition:  
 
Digital intermediaries are software-based institutions that have the potential to influence the 
flow of online information between providers (publishers) and consumers.  
 
Since this definition could theoretically include a very wide range of phenomena including small 
blogs and embedded search engines, we narrow our focus to identify whether a small subset of 
these institutions exercise a degree of influence and control in news markets that would justify 
sector-specific public interest regulation to protect media plurality.[5] 
 
Digital intermediaries in this narrower category could potentially include: (i) search engines such 
as Google and Bing; (ii) social networks such as Facebook and Twitter; (iii) news aggregators 
including Flipboard and Google News; and (iv) Mobile App Stores such as the Apple app store 
or Google Play. As Figure 1 highlights, the digital intermediary sits between the provider of 
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information and the end user, adding a layer of potential editorial influence. By editorial 
influence we mean the gatekeeping process of, selecting, prioritising and filtering news content 
[6] before it is presented to the consumer. They are concerned with the general notion of altering 
the presentation of news content before it reaches the consumer. How news is presented is hugely 
significant because of information abundance online. The vast majority of consumers click and 
view the first few links of information presented to them when using search engines and social 
media sites (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Petrescu, 2014). Information consumed can 
therefore be significantly influenced by those who control these prominent slots. This is in 
contrast with TV or radio content where publishers are able to distribute their content directly to 
consumers or via electronic programme guides [7] (Cowie and Marsden, 1999; El Husseini, 
2013). It is important to note, however that not all online news access is via an intermediary. 
Users also access news websites directly.   
 
FIGURE 1 HERE. 
 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the digital intermediaries in scope are those with the largest audience 
reach (illustrated by indicative circle size) that are carrying out gatekeeping processes within the 
news and current affairs category. Search engines and social media have algorithms which 
localise, prioritise and omit information before it reaches consumers. The workings of their 
algorithms are secret and their audience reach is large (Meyer, 2015). A political blog is a digital 
intermediary but outside the scope of this paper because their audience share is not significant 
enough to warrant public interest scrutiny. Similarly ISPs and mobile operators are also digital 
Page 14 of 53info
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
15 
 
intermediaries because of their ability to zero rate or prioritise content in commercial 
partnerships with publishers (Goodman, 2014; Graef, 2015). For reasons of space, and because 
this topic has been dealt with at length elsewhere (Van Eijk, 2011; Krämer et al., 2013) we will 
restrict our focus to search and social intermediaries.   
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even within these categories there are distinctions to be made concerning the extent and nature 
of their editorial influence on content.  
 
The popular social networks for consumption of news (Newman and Levy, 2015) present content 
in different ways. While Twitter is often considered to be the more ‘neutral’ outlet because 
content is largely unfiltered on users timelines, Facebook’s newsfeed actively prioritises content 
based on what it predicts users will find most engaging (Backstrom, 2013). In reality both 
networks are involved in prioritising content. Both Twitter and Facebook use ‘trending topics’ to 
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suggest content to users based on what stories are currently popular. This is in contrast to other 
social networks used for consuming news like Whatsapp, where content is shared between users 
with little involvement from the platform provider. Search engines, on the other hand, are by 
their very nature involved in the ranking of content. While one could argue that there are 
differences between Google, Bing and Yahoo around the extent of personalisation and data 
capture to make ranking decisions, their unifying raison d'être is to provide users with the most 
relevant results which implies exercising editorial influence over presentation of content. 
 
Figure 2 can also help with distinguishing within the search and social categories. By examining 
individual search engines and social networks along the lines of scale of use and extent and 
transparency of gatekeeping, it can help determine which Intermediaries might represent more of 
a public interest concern. For example, Facebook might be more of a public interest concern than 
Whatsapp because of the extent of gatekeeping, while Google would be of greater interest than 
Yahoo because it attracts so many more users than the latter (Meyer, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3: Analytical Framework, Research Questions, Methodology and Data 
 
In order to investigate the extent and nature of digital intermediary influence over online news 
distribution in the UK, we use the following three stage analytical framework for analysis. 
 
(i) How prevalent is online news within consumers’ media diets?  
(ii) What proportion of online news flows through Intermediaries? 
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(iii)  How much editorial influence is exerted on the online news that flows through  
Intermediaries? 
 
This structure is designed to place the concern around intermediaries into the wider context of a 
consumer’s media exposure or ‘diet’. Media convergence has shifted consumers towards multi-
device and multi-channel consumption. Concerns about intermediaries and news plurality might 
be premature if they represent a small share of an average media diet. 
 
To address the first question we rely on existing secondary research on news consumption 
platforms from Ofcom and The Office of National Statistics. For the second and third questions, 
which require data on website referrals we obtained proprietary data from a commercial web 
analytics monitoring company-SimilarWeb and the BBC news website. In addition we also used 
secondary consumer research from the Reuters Digital News Report.   
 
There are limitations to the data we present.. We were unable to independently corroborate how 
statistically representative the proprietary data from SimilarWeb is of the UK Internet population. 
We made multiple attempts to source other data sources from major publishers, a search engine 
and a magazine publisher group but were ultimately unsuccessful.[8] As a result we make no 
comparative claims on the basis of this data. Our aim is to give an indicative view on the scale of 
intermediaries influence on digital news distribution in the UK based on the information 
available to us (and to regulators such as Ofcom who have monitoring duties[9]) and prompt 
future empirical research with more comprehensive data sources.  
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Section 3: The Evidence  
 
3.1: How prevalent is online news within the context of consumers’ media diet? 
 
 According to consumer survey research from Ofcom (2014),[10] the Internet is now the second 
most used platform for accessing news ‘nowadays’ after TV and continues to show growth (up 
9% on 2013). Meanwhile TV saw a 3% year on year decline from 2013 to 2014. For younger 
demographics (16-34), the Internet has already become their most used news platform; 60% 
claim to access their news from any Internet connected device compared with 56% for TV (see 
Figure 3). Similarly, data from the Office of National Statistics (2015) compliments this view of 
rising internet popularity with 62% of UK adults reading news, newspapers and magazines 
online[11] in 2015, which represents a threefold increase from 2007, with higher usage reported in 
younger age groups (77% of 25-34 year olds and 74% of 35-44 year olds). 
 
In summary, the data available to us confirm that the Internet is an increasingly popular platform 
for accessing news. It plays a role in an average consumer’s news exposure comparable to 
newspapers and for some younger demographics has already become their most used news 
source ahead of TV.  This would suggest that there is a need to better understand the implications 
of these new consumption patterns for media plurality. To do so requires an understanding of two 
questions: how much of all online news flows through intermediaries, and what degree of 
editorial control they exert. 
 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE. 
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3.2: What proportion of online news flows through intermediaries? 
 
Consumers can access online news sites in a number of ways such as by typing a web address 
into a browser, via a search engine, social network or news aggregator. Web referral data which 
records where sites receive their traffic from can help quantify how much online news, 
intermediaries are in a position to potentially influence.  
 
Most referral data is owned by publishers, ISPs or commercial data providers and as such is 
regarded as commercially sensitive. Answering this question comprehensively would require 
gaining access to data from a large intermediary, ISP or individually significant publishers (In the 
UK, BBC, Guardian, Daily Mail etc.) and collating. As detailed above efforts to do so were 
largely unsuccessful, so we relied on a commercial analytics provider, SimilarWeb which 
monitors digital browsing behaviour on the Internet.     
 
SimilarWeb[12] tracks traffic to websites by enlisting a panel of over 200 million Internet users 
globally who agree to provide de-identified data on their browsing activity including which sites 
they visit and how they arrive at those sites (referrals).  This primary source is supplemented 
through direct measurement from Internet Service providers in and key websites.  
 
Through data obtained from SimilarWeb, search engines[13] and social media were responsible 
for referring 48.6% of desktop traffic to newspaper sites[14] in the UK in August 2015 (see Figure 
5). Looking at the broader category of news and media sites,[15] which include some publishers 
whose output is not strictly limited to news and current affairs such as Yahoo, MSN and BBC, 
search and social contributes 39.8% of their desktop traffic.  
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There are important limitations to bear in mind when interpreting this data. First, it only includes 
desktop traffic at a time of increasing mobile access. Second, we were unable to independently 
verify how statistical representative it is of the UK internet population. The company claimed it 
monitors between 4-7% of the Internet population in the UK and employs a number of 
measures[16] to ensure the data is statistically representative. We were however unable to gain 
access to demographic information (which the company does not collect) to independently verify 
this and unable to corroborate their claims above. Finally we were only able to capture 1 month 
of data. 
 
Nonetheless it provides the most complete snapshot we have on the role of intermediaries in the 
news industry in the UK. Almost 50% of readers consuming news on newspaper websites on 
non- mobile devices are referred by search engines or social networks. (Fig 5.)  
 
 
In addition to data from SimilarWeb, we received proprietary data from the BBC news website. 
This data showed that 18% of the total traffic referred was from search engines and social 
networks (see Figure 4) although for an earlier time period than the data above.   
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
While there are limitations to the data available to us, from each angle it shows a significant role 
for digital intermediaries. Almost 50% of online newspaper traffic in the UK is referred by 
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intermediaries. One of the most high profile news websites in the UK, the BBC, also shows a 
significant role for intermediaries with almost a fifth of its traffic coming from Search and Social 
media.  
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
Claimed usage data from news consumers can also give an indicative view of the scale of 
intermediaries. When consumers were asked to specify how they accessed online news last 
week, search engines (32%) and social media (28%) came out as the second and third most 
important referral routes (Newman and Levy, 2014; 2015) (Figure 6) although it is important to 
exercise caution when interpreting these results due to well documented biases with self-reported 
new consumption (Prior, 2009). However, taken together with the referral data, it appears to 
corroborate the conclusion that intermediaries are referring significant share of news traffic 
online.   
 
Within this section, our aim is not to definitively state the exact proportion of online news traffic 
that is referred by digital intermediaries in the UK.  Due to the limitations in the data as detailed 
above it is not possible to do so with certainty. What does emerge however is that digital 
intermediaries play a significant role in the distribution of news in what is a large and growing 
share of consumer’s news diets- online. While there are sure to be variations at a brand level and 
movement over time, at an aggregate level we have seen that Intermediaries are responsible for 
distributing a considerable share of news traffic.   
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FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
 
3.3: How much editorial influence is exerted on the online news that flows through 
intermediaries? The Online Gatekeeping Continuum.  
 
 
On the basis of the limited data in the public domain and the data that we have been able to 
access from proprietary sources, it has been possible to establish two things. Firstly, online news 
makes up a significant and growing proportion of consumers’ overall media diet. Secondly, 
around half of all online news audience is referred via intermediaries. These findings suggest that 
digital intermediaries have the potential to influence a significant share of a consumers news 
diets. By influence, we mean the ability to affect the content consumers see through a process of 
filtering, omitting and prioritising certain types of information.  
 
The potential to influence is of course not the same as exercising influence. As we have seen, 
intermediaries are quick to deny an editorial role, (House of Lords Select Committee on 
Communication, 2014) and because of the lack of transparency in relevance algorithms, the 
nature of this influence remains a black box. 
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In theoretical terms, there is a continuum from neutrality at one end, to online gatekeeping at the 
other (see Figure 7). User agency is an important determinant of what consumers see and read 
online. What keywords a user enters into a search engine or an app store, which news 
organisations or what friends they connect to on social media are important factors determining 
what news content is presented and consumed. 
 
    
FIGURE 7 HERE 
 
 
Establishing the degree of gatekeeping versus neutrality is the most difficult of our three 
questions. This is in part because of the oft-criticised algorithmic opacity (Diakopoulos, 2014) 
and, in part, because user agency and ‘learning’ by algorithms lead to a high degree of tailoring 
and targeting of relevance for individual consumers.  
 
Whilst it is difficult to quantify user agency, data from search engines can offer some insights. 
When a user searches ‘BBC’ or ‘Sun website’ they are using search as a navigational rather than 
an editorial tool. Users could on the other hand trigger the intermediary to move further towards 
gatekeeping by searching for ‘election candidates’. In this case the user does not have a specific 
news publisher in mind and is reliant on the ‘judgement’ of the search engine to give them a 
result. In the former case, they are substituting typing the full web address into the browser with 
a quicker, easier option; in the latter they delegate editorial judgement to the intermediary. Here 
is a subtle but important difference. It illustrates that while consumers may use search engines 
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(or other intermediaries), not all instances are indicative of online gatekeeping. The editorial 
influence exerted by the intermediary varies according to user agency.  
 
FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
 
Both claimed survey data (Fig. 8) and internal data from the BBC (Fig. 5) suggest that at least 
half of the search traffic directed to news websites in the UK comes from such ‘brand searches’. 
The top 50 searched keywords to newspaper websites in the UK drove 32% of the total search 
engine traffic in August 2015. Out of this 32%, more than half (18%) were from keywords 
associated with news brands and publishers. The top 3 keywords which represented 11% of UK 
search to newspaper websites in August 2015 were for ‘guardian’, ‘the guardian’ and 
‘telegraph’.[17] This traffic would sit closer to the neutrality[18] end of our continuum whereas the 
non-branded search would sit closer to gatekeeping.   
 
User agency is an important factor in other intermediary services. When a user logs into 
Facebook or Twitter, the news they consume comes from publishers they or their friends have 
chosen to connect to, not just the news content algorithms decide they should see. Researchers 
from Facebook (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic , 2015) attempted to separate out and quantify 
these effects on their social network using a sample of 10.1 million US Facebook users who have 
identified themselves as politically conservative or liberal. The study found that while 
Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm is associated with reducing the cross cutting content (news their 
political views are opposed to) that a user is exposed to, this is a smaller reduction than the effect 
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of personal choices, i.e. what a user clicks on and which pages they choose to follow.[19] Using 
the example of users whose friends had shared at least one ideologically consistent and one cross 
cutting article, they found that 99% of this group had exposure to the ideologically consistent 
article and 96% had exposure to the cross cutting article due to the effects of Facebook’s 
newsfeed algorithm, in essence a reduction of 3%. However only 54% of users clicked on the 
ideologically cross cutting article compared to 87% who clicked on the ideologically consistent 
article, illustrating the bigger drop in exposure to diverse content arising from user behaviour. 
Similar results were found with another big data inquiry into 3.6 million Twitter users (Barberá 
et al, 2015). Utilising the user’s connections to identify their political preferences, the study finds 
that individuals are more likely to share information that corresponds with their ideological 
preferences. 
 
The Facebook study has been criticised (Tufekci, 2015; Jurgenson, 2015; Hargittai, 2015; 
Sandvig, 2015) for its skewed sampling as well as the comparison of its algorithmic suppression 
effect to established research on individuals avoiding cross cutting content. Notwithstanding 
these criticisms, these studies highlight that users do choose to read or share content that is 
aligned with their ideological preferences and this is as true in the digital sphere as research has 
shown it to be in traditional media (Stroud, 2007;  Klapper, 1960). [20] 
 
Returning to the question of the nature and extent of influence that intermediaries exert on online 
news traffic, these studies show that consumers are not passive agents. They selectively expose 
themselves to certain types of news content over others. They have existing beliefs that affect 
what they click on or share with their friends. They have preferred websites or news brands 
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which they intend to visit (or wish to hear from) and utilise the search engine or social media site 
as a conduit to enable them do so easily and quickly. However intermediaries do determine 
which sites are prioritised when a user searches for generic news terms. They determine whether 
a publisher’s posts will be included in their follower’s newsfeeds or activity streams. This ability 
to influence visibility is a powerful determinant of which stories get read. Evidence suggests that 
only the most visible and prominent of content receives traffic (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 
2015; Petrescu, 2014). 
 
Section 4: Discussion  
 
We have established that intermediaries are responsible for distributing a significant share of 
online news traffic to digital publishers. However not every use of an intermediary to access 
news is indicative of editorial influence. User agency also determines how content is prioritised, 
presented and consumed. This is relevant for policymakers. In contrast to traditional discussions 
of media power and its regulation (for example the notion of mass media plurality) it is not 
possible to make inferences on influence simply by observing the market share of intermediaries. 
Google’s 90% search engine market share in Europe (European Parliament, 2015c) and 
Facebook referring an increasing number of visitors (Ingram, 2015; Osofsky, 2013) to news 
publishers tell us about the potential to influence but not about the extent or nature of influence. 
 
Media lurality has been seen as vital for a healthy democracy (Craufurd Smith and Tambini, 
2012) because it: 
 
(i) Gives citizens a spectrum of news and current affairs they need to make informed po-
litical choices;  
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(ii) Reduces the potential for powerful media interests to wield undue influence over the 
political agenda.  
 
The former has attracted a lot of attention. The debate about the extent to which intermediaries 
contribute to the filter bubble effect is ongoing and as yet inconclusive (Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 
2013; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; An et al, 2012; Bakshy, 
Messing and Adamic, 2015). This paper argues that the latter is also a concern. In a converged 
media ecology, ‘media interests’ are no longer restricted to publishers but include also those that 
have the ability to influence what news and current affairs may be consumed. As this ability to 
influence (in the case of intermediaries) is shrouded in secrecy it is imperative that regulators and 
policymakers develop an adequate approach to defining and monitoring this power before taking 
steps to regulate it.  
 
Given the current regulatory obligations to monitor and protect media plurality, policymakers 
will need to deepen their expertise in algorithm operation and user behaviour on these platforms 
to understand and separate out the influence of intermediaries from that of user agency. 
Undoubtedly this will require co-operation from major intermediaries to release into the public 
domain de-identified data of the type used in the aforementioned Facebook study for 
independent researchers to analyse. 
 
Future research on the nature and extent of intermediary impact on news plurality should include 
the following: 
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Data Requirements for News Plurality Monitoring: some examples  
 
Research Question Data Required Data Source 
Are intermediaries sending consumers to a 
diverse or narrow set of news publishers?  
A breakdown of all the news publishers (by traffic vol-
ume) that an intermediary sent traffic to in a given peri-
od compared with the distribution of news sites visited 
without the influence of intermediaries e.g. Direct visits  
Commercial analytics service e.g. 
Comscore or Similarweb or 
browser data from Internet Ex-
plorer or Google Chrome.    
How many users rely on the editorial function 
of the search engine to guide them to relevant 
website compared to those that use search as a 
quick and easy route to their preferred web-
sites?  
Percentage of news traffic that comes from ‘brand’ 
search queries e.g. BBC compared to those from more 
generic search queries e.g. ‘general election news’.  
Search Engines e.g. Google, 
Bing. Commercial analytics ser-
vice e.g. Experian Hitwise. 
What proportion of news content delivered on 
social media is the result of a user directly 
following a news organisation versus that us-
er’s friends following the news organisation?  
This quantifies the news delivered due to algo-
rithm influence or how much the social plat-
form can extend reach for the publisher? 
Looking at referrals from social media and consumption 
of news content on social platforms, what percentage of 
these are consumers who follow the new organisation 
versus those that do not and are shown this content be-
cause an algorithm thinks they might be interested in it. 
 
Social Media Platform: Facebook  
How much of publishers content does not reach 
it’s intended audience because of the impact of 
algorithms versus the impact of users choosing 
not to read. What percentage of posts: 
-are seen by its followers 
-are clicked through/ read  
- are not shown at all because of algorithmic 
design  
  
A dataset of social media users who follow selected 
publishers showing which articles they saw, read and 
those they did not see but were eligible to see e.g. they 
were logged in during the period when they were pub-
lished.  
A corresponding list of all the news posts the selected 
news publishers made in the period.  
Social Media Platform: Facebook 
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In addition to these specific data points which can help shed light on the nature and extent of 
intermediary influence on news consumption, plurality researchers and regulators will need to 
better understand algorithm design.  In response to scholars like Pasquale and Bracha (2008) 
who have argued for direct disclosure of algorithms to regulators, we argue that algorithm 
monitoring may impose a too heavy a cost burden on regulators. As Sandvig et al (2015) 
highlight, algorithms are dependent on user input. The results one user might see may be very 
different to another. The implication being that having access to the design of an algorithm might 
not tell you very much about how that algorithm works as the results are very different 
dependent on who is using it. 
 
In the media sphere, ethical self-regulation often precedes and sometimes prevents heavy- 
handed regulatory intervention. An alternative approach may thus be for Intermediaries to 
voluntarily enter into a dialogue with an expert panel of academics, policymakers, regulators and 
industry professionals to explore the implications of algorithmic design on media plurality and 
other matters of public interest. Within this forum intermediaries might submit to a light touch 
voluntary audit, by making available employees that can explain the basis of algorithmic design 
in a context of respect for commercial confidentiality. 
 
They might describe what determines which sites are prioritised when a user searches for a 
generic news query for different sets of users (those logged in, personalisation enabled, 
personalisation disabled). Similarly what factors determine whether a news story is presented 
into a user’s newsfeed on social media. This group might then make recommendations to the 
regulator about certain features and their impact on the public interest. It might also request data 
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from the intermediaries if the impact of a certain feature was unclear, ambiguous or disputed.  To 
be sure the operational guidelines of such an expert panel would need to be well thought through 
to ensure it was effective, fit for purpose but also did not result in any of the pitfalls direct 
regulatory intervention would bring (Foster, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion   
 
 
Would it be a problem if 90% of all news consumed was delivered to consumers as the result of a 
Google search for a news topic or person? If Facebook continues to displace the open web, might 
it be justified to oblige the social network to disclose how, why and to what extent its proprietary 
algorithms may have the effect of promoting, blocking or demographically targeting news 
stories? The debate about ‘algorithmic power’ is just beginning to raise these questions for public 
debate. 
 
This paper has examined algorithmic power of intermediaries through the prism of the existing, 
agreed public policy objective of maintaining media plurality. Within that perspective, and on the 
basis of the limited evidence available we have presented a conceptual framework for 
understanding the problem that may be useful to future researchers and regulators. Examining 
available evidence we find that regulators will be unable to build a complete picture and 
therefore argue that new data and disclosure requirements are necessary. 
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We set out to examine the degree and nature of digital intermediary control over news distribu-
tion and consumption by asking how much of news consumption is online, how much of online 
news is mediated by intermediaries, and how much editorial control is exercised by those inter-
mediaries. In relation to the first question, it is clear that whilst other, non-intermediated news 
distribution platforms such as TV and the press remain highly important, online is heading to-
wards being the most important distribution platform, particularly for younger people. With re-
gards to the second question we found that intermediaries such as search and social media con-
trol access to a significant proportion of online news content. While the number varies according 
to the news brand, the data available to us indicates somewhere in the region of half of online 
news readers are referred by intermediaries in the UK.  
 
On the third question which related to the nature and degree of the editorial influence the availa-
ble evidence is weakest due to the lack of transparency of relevance algorithms. However we 
have outlined a crucial but important distinction. While algorithms influence the news content 
users see and subsequently read so also do users themselves. This insight is important for any 
regulatory intervention into intermediaries. Unlike T.V. and broadcasting, regulators cannot in-
tervene solely on the basis of market share as this masks underlying nuances in how power is 
exercised.  
 
This indicates promising avenues for further research. More empirical data is required primarily 
from intermediaries and major publishers to understand the nature of editorial influence and how 
this affects different groups. We have noted some of the data that is required, and presented one 
way this might happen, an expert forum which would alleviate some of the confidentiality con-
cerns of commercial groups and not present too heavy a burden on regulators.  
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1 The authors would like to acknowledge comments and feedback from Robin Mansell, and participants at a workshop held at LSE in October 
2015. This paper benefitted from research assistance part funded by a donation from Microsoft to LSE. The authors are wholly responsible for the 
content and conclusions. 
2 In Germany the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting establishes a threshold whereby a company that controls 30% of audience share is presumed 
to have a predominant power over opinion formation, and in the UK the Communications Act 2003 Schedule 14 prevents companies with more 
than a 20% share in newspaper markets purchasing the operator of a Channel 3 TV licence. 
3 The difficulty of defining media pluralism was noted by Philip Napoli who differentiated source, content and exposure diversity. More recently  
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phenomenon of ‘filter bubbles’ whereby recommendation algorithms have the collective effect of narrowing exposure diversity because they  
target based on previous preferences has been linked to media plurality, with the result that the concept is more difficult to define than ever. 
4 Broadcast Audience Research Board (BARB); Radio Joint Audience Research; (RAJAR) Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) 
5 This paper narrows the focus in its discussion of media plurality to focus on news markets as the most influential on news and the political 
system. This follows the practice in recent regulatory approaches for example House of Lords Select Committee On Communication and DCMS. 
6 Not all these processes need to occur simultaneously. A search engine might shape content by prioritizing a news website a user has previously 
visited which naturally involves demoting other websites. A social media side might prioritize news content that other users are finding engaging. 
See: http://www.google.co.uk/insidesearch/howsearchworks/algorithms.html and http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/02/news-feed-fyi-showing-
stories-about-topics-you-like/ (accessed Sep.28, 2015)   
7 Ofcom commissioned research analysed the impact of EPG prominence on audience in El Husseini, 2013 report. The reports authors f 
found that it was a significant driver of audience.  
8 Multiple data requests were made to individual publishers, the European Magazine Media Association and a Search Engine for access to 
proprietary industry data on traffic and referrals. These were refused on the basis of commercial sensitivity and data privacy:  
UK Editor of Buzzfeed contacted by email on 12th Feb 2015- declined. Chief Data Officer of Financial Times contacted by email (twice) in Feb. 
2015- did not respond. Email and Phone Correspondence with the Guardian Media Group Head of Public Policy during Feb. and March 2015. 
While there was an initial willingness to supply data, this was eventually not acceded in internal discussions. Multiple email, phone and in person 
conversations with Microsoft Digital Policy team in Brussels through late 2014 and 2015 to share data from Bing and/or Internet Explorer 
toolbar.  Email Correspondence with the European Magazine Media Association during May-Sep. 2015 did not result in any data provided  
9 Under the 2003 Communications Act Ofcom has a duty to monitor media plurality in the UK and advise on mergers. In response to 
Parliamentary and Government requests, monitoring was extended in 2015 to cover Internet intermediaries. (Ofcom, 2015).  
10 The survey question is designed to only assess the relative popularity of news platforms by asking respondents to check all answers that apply. 
“Which of the following do you use for news nowadays ?”  74% answered TV while 41% claimed Internet.  
11 ONS survey question does not explicitly specific news and current affairs content only so is indicative. 
12 Data Provider was SimilarWeb, a commercial web analytics solution. Clickstream data is tracked through de-identified data collected from a 
panel of 200 million users globally who agree to install software that tracks their Internet activity. This data is supplemented from local Internet 
Service Providers and direct tracking of key websites through collaboration with publishers. Panel is constructed from users who agree to 
download a diverse selection of free software in return for providing anonymised statistics on their desktop PC usage. Exact Panel Size in UK 
was not revealed to authors due to commercial sensitivities but company said it covered between 4-7% of Internet population in the UK. 
Company does not monitor statistics on demographics so authors were unable to verify whether the data was representative of average Internet 
users in the UK however the company gave assurances that the sites users downloaded the tracking software from were random to avoid sampling 
bias. See more at: http://www.similarweb.com/ourdata         
13 Traffic from News aggregators such as Google News, Bing News and Yahoo News are included within Search Engines.  
14  See Appendix 1 for a list of the Top 50 websites by visits in the newspaper category. August 2015 data covered 108 million visits. Please note 
that newspapers are manually categorised as sites who main content is news e.g. Guardian, Telegraph while sites such as the Daily Mail and BBC 
are classed as News and Media sites as they contain non-news content. See Appendix 2.  
15  See Appendix 2 for a list of the Top 50 websites by visits in the news and media category. August 2015. 878million visits.  
16  Users downloading the tracking software are randomly selected to avoid sampling bias.  Direct Measurement from ISPs and key websites are 
used as learning data sets to ensure panel data is representative and accurate. Additionally panel is continually ‘cleaned’ for outliers, inactive and 
unrepresentative users.  See more at: https://www.similarweb.com/downloads/our-data-methodology.pdf 
17 See Appendix 3. Top 50 UK Desktop Search Traffic Keywords in August. 2015.  
18 Neutrality here is seen as when an intermediary delivers content with little or no editorial influence. Consider the Twitter user timeline (neutral) 
Vs. Facebook news feed (non-neutral). We make no normative assessments on the value of neutrality versus gatekeeping. The debate about 
intermediary editorial influence is concerned with the lack of transparency about how algorithms work rather than their existence. Without 
transparency it is difficult to assess whether these ‘relevance’ algorithms are prioritising (and not suppressing) content and information that is in 
the public interest  
19 In reality, consumers do not consume news randomly. In general they chose to consume news that confirms their ideological preferences. (e.g 
in choice of newspapers). 
20 Some Scholars dispute there is a selective exposure in the media. See, Kinder, 2003  
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Fig 1: Digital Intermediaries Editorial Influence.         Source: Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2: Conceptualizing Digital Intermediaries (circle sizes suggests scale). Not to Scale.    Source: Authors 
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Fig.3. Which of the following do you use for news nowadays? (16-24) N= 2014:2731. 2013: 2862. 
 Any internet is an aggregate of all internet devices. 
Source: Ofcom, 2014 
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Fig.4 Weekly Average Visits to BBC News Online for period Dec’13-Feb’14     
         Source: Internal BBC Data.  
 
 
Fig.5.  Desktop Referrals to Newspaper and News and Media Sites in the UK.  Aug. 2015              
Source: SimilarWeb  
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Fig.6 Which were the ways in which you came across news stories last week? (Please select all that apply). UK 2014=2082, 
2015=2149 
Source:  (Newman & Levy, 2014, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig.7 Continuum of Intermediaries editorial influence      Source: Authors  
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Branded Search  62% 
Generic Search  38% 
 
Fig.8. Search Gateways in Detail: What were the ways in which you searched for online news last week? UK= 2082 
 
Source:  (Newman & Levy, 2014)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Top 50 Newspaper Websites in UK: Aug. 2015. (Desktop Only) Source: SimilarWeb 
Rank Domain Main Category Subcategory 
1 theguardian.com News and Media Newspapers 
2 telegraph.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
3 nytimes.com News and Media Newspapers 
4 indiatimes.com News and Media Newspapers 
5 standard.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
6 manchestereveningnews.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
7 gazeta.pl News and Media Newspapers 
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8 rt.com News and Media Newspapers 
9 repubblica.it News and Media Newspapers 
10 liverpoolecho.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
11 dailyrecord.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
12 thetimes.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
13 washingtonpost.com News and Media Newspapers 
14 walesonline.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
15 lemonde.fr News and Media Newspapers 
16 scotsman.com News and Media Newspapers 
17 corriere.it News and Media Newspapers 
18 elpais.com News and Media Newspapers 
19 birminghammail.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
20 chroniclelive.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
21 delfi.lv News and Media Newspapers 
22 tvnet.lv News and Media Newspapers 
23 hulldailymail.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
24 expressandstar.com News and Media Newspapers 
25 index.hu News and Media Newspapers 
26 belfasttelegraph.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
27 milliyet.com.tr News and Media Newspapers 
28 newstatesman.com News and Media Newspapers 
29 bristolpost.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
30 jang.com.pk News and Media Newspapers 
31 rambler.ru News and Media Newspapers 
32 smh.com.au News and Media Newspapers 
33 independent.ie News and Media Newspapers 
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34 nbcnews.com News and Media Newspapers 
35 nydailynews.com News and Media Newspapers 
36 kentonline.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
37 in.gr News and Media Newspapers 
38 heraldscotland.com News and Media Newspapers 
39 dailyecho.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
40 sfgate.com News and Media Newspapers 
41 nottinghampost.com News and Media Newspapers 
42 ilfattoquotidiano.it News and Media Newspapers 
43 southwales-eveningpost.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
44 theboltonnews.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
45 plymouthherald.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
46 stokesentinel.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
47 theweek.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
48 latimes.com News and Media Newspapers 
49 mic.com News and Media Newspapers 
50 thesundaytimes.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Top 50 News and Media Websites in UK: Aug. 2015. (Desktop Only)  
Rank Domain Main Category Subcategory 
1 yahoo.com News and Media   
2 bbc.co.uk News and Media   
3 msn.com News and Media   
4 dailymail.co.uk News and Media   
5 theguardian.com News and Media Newspapers 
6 telegraph.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
7 skysports.com News and Media Sports News 
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8 newsnow.co.uk News and Media   
9 ibtimes.co.uk News and Media   
10 independent.co.uk News and Media   
11 mirror.co.uk News and Media   
12 buzzfeed.com News and Media Magazines and E-Zines 
13 cnet.com News and Media Technology News 
14 news.yahoo.com News and Media   
15 metoffice.gov.uk News and Media Weather 
16 onet.pl News and Media   
17 wp.pl News and Media   
18 bbc.com News and Media   
19 about.com News and Media   
20 sportinglife.com News and Media Sports News 
21 theladbible.com News and Media   
22 news.google.co.uk News and Media   
23 news.sky.com News and Media   
24 huffingtonpost.co.uk News and Media   
25 express.co.uk News and Media   
26 xe.com News and Media Business News 
27 metro.co.uk News and Media   
28 liveleak.com News and Media   
29 sports.yahoo.com News and Media Sports News 
30 techradar.com News and Media Technology News 
31 abv.bg News and Media   
32 forbes.com News and Media Magazines and E-Zines 
33 nytimes.com News and Media Newspapers 
34 timeout.com News and Media Magazines and E-Zines 
35 which.co.uk News and Media   
36 mashable.com News and Media   
37 interia.pl News and Media   
38 accuweather.com News and Media Weather 
39 espncricinfo.com News and Media Sports News 
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40 bloomberg.com News and Media Business News 
41 cnn.com News and Media   
42 dailystar.co.uk News and Media   
43 ft.com News and Media Business News 
44 vice.com News and Media Magazines and E-Zines 
45 businessinsider.com News and Media Business News 
46 thesun.co.uk News and Media Magazines and E-Zines 
47 indiatimes.com News and Media Newspapers 
48 huffingtonpost.com News and Media   
49 standard.co.uk News and Media Newspapers 
50 edition.cnn.com News and Media   
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
Top 50 UK Desktop Search Traffic Keywords in August. 2015. Source: SimilarWeb 
Search terms Percent of traffic sent to category  
guardian 6.006941751% 
telegraph 2.939268668% 
the guardian 2.031305099% 
arsenal 1.506108535% 
jeremy corbyn 1.366783998% 
tube strike 1.298398230% 
daily telegraph 1.190109328% 
manchester united 0.945735547% 
cilla black 0.914421070% 
when was the first traffic light 
installed 0.794924716% 
evening standard 0.691972800% 
arsenal transfer news 0.691214190% 
the telegraph 0.662208702% 
manchester evening news 0.656083024% 
corbyn 0.597698012% 
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liverpool echo 0.548378879% 
daily record 0.544460214% 
the times 0.380721918% 
dismaland 0.368716481% 
facebook 0.361088599% 
birmingham mail 0.360830828% 
liverpool 0.318398134% 
men 0.309952101% 
donald trump 0.308386575% 
aston villa 0.291693564% 
windows 10 0.288991024% 
wales online 0.285119806% 
new york times 0.265285680% 
express and star 0.264102196% 
belfast telegraph 0.260599249% 
iphone 7 0.258884725% 
la tomatina 0.252363363% 
ashley madison 0.250581257% 
hull daily mail 0.249221083% 
celtic 0.237644326% 
chelsea 0.230513600% 
man utd transfer news 0.229785625% 
manchester united transfer news 0.228527093% 
eva carneiro 0.227250172% 
lbc 0.224278532% 
news 0.213582394% 
times 0.210746033% 
tube strike august 2015 0.205709533% 
scotsman 0.198563999% 
google 0.196953136% 
rt news 0.195100265% 
tube strikes 0.193551749% 
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benzema 0.189831500% 
mh370 0.188321736% 
rangers 0.187769804% 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 53 of 53 info
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
